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I. INTRODUCTION

Within the last decade, Ohio courts have encountered a significant increase
in the number of legal malpractice cases. Ohio, however, is by no means the
exception. Almost every state is experiencing an explosion in legal malpractice
litigation. Unfortunately, there is no real explanation for this phenomena.
Perhaps it is the consequence of a society which is overly result-oriented.
People feel that results can be controlled and that someone should be held
accountable if there is a failure to produce the desired end. Claims of legal

1B.A., Kent State University; J.D., Ohio State University. The author would
like to thank Jeffrey S. Marcalus, J.D., Capital University, for his research and
editorial effort.
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malpractice tend to reflect this attitude. Clients dissatisfied with the results of
a particular legal action seek relief against their attorney, judging his or her
performance by hindsight. This may have a chilling effect on zealous
representation if claims of legal malpractice continue to grow at their present
rate.
This article will discuss the fundamentals of a legal malpractice case,
specifically addressing two areas. The first involves the elements of a legal
malpractice case. This discussion will expose two problems that continually
appear in legal malpractice litigation: (1) expanding the liability of an attorney
to third parties, and (2) determining whether the alleged malpractice was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The second area of discussion will
focus on the time limitations imposed for bringing a legal malpractice action.
Additionally, in order to better understand the current state of the law, a brief
discussion illustrating the historical development of the applicable statute of
limitations will be instructive.
II. ELEMENTS OF A LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM
To succeed in a legal malpractice action in Ohio, the aggrieved party must
satisfy three requirements. It must be established that: (1) an attorney-client
relationship existed which gave rise to a duty; (2) there occurred a breach of
that duty; and (3) damages were proximately caused by the breach. 2 Because
much of Ohio's legal malpractice litigation has centered around proof of these
three elements, a closer examination is warranted.
A. Attorney-Client Relationship
The most fundamental requirement of any legal malpractice action is
establishing that an attorney-client relationship existed at the time the alleged
malpractice occurred. This relationship is contractual in nature; therefore, usual
principles of agency law govern its parameters. 3 Although compensation is a
significant component of the relationship, it is not an exclusive element
necessary to a determination of whether an attorney-client relationship existed,
nor is the payment of a fee a condition precedent to an attorney-client
4
relationship.
In most situations, determining whether an attorney-client relationship
existed is a question of fact. A formal written contract is not necessary to create
an attorney-client relationship because it may be implied from the conduct of
the parties. 5 Under Ohio law, an attorney-client relationship is consensual in
2

Krahn v. Kinney, 538 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio 1989); Belfer v. Spiegel, 480
N.E.2d 825 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
3
In re Estate of Clark, 229 N.E.2d 122 (Ohio C.P. 1967).
4
Doblanski v. Goldberg, No. 88-T-4080, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 4299 (11th
Dist. Nov. 17, 1989).
5
See generally, 7 AM. JUR.2d Attorneys at Law § 118, 187-88 (1980).
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nature and can only arise when both the attorney and the client consent to its
formation. 6 A "client" within the context of an att rney-client relationship is
generally defined as "one who employs and retains an attorney or counselor to
manage or defend a suit or action to which he is a party, or to advise him about
'7
some legal matter."
Many have argued that an attorney-client relationship may arise when an
attorney advises a party about a legal matter even though representation is not
undertaken or is subsequently declined. Moreover, when a prospective client
approaches an attorney with the view toward retaining his services, an
attorney-client relationship is created. 8 Other jurisdictions have held that an
attorney-client relationship exists where the putative client seeks advice and
the attorney renders the same.9
In addition to the implied and expressed contractual relationships which
provide a foundation for a malpractice action, a professional claim may also
sound in tort. In essence, a cause of action based upon legal malpractice is a
tort action for negligence. This claim is based upon a breach of the attorney's
duties to his client. The fact that the attorney had no duty to render legal advice
to the client is separate from the issue of duty where he undertakes to render
advice that is likely to be relied upon.lO
It has been argued that where a party is not adverse, gratuitous advice can
require the same standard of care as if there were a formal retainer.11 The scope
of this duty does not usually depend upon the manner in which the relationship
is created, nor does the existence of duty depend upon payment of a fee. 12 In
6

Hermann, Cahn & Schneider v. Viny, 537 N.E.2d 236,239 (Ohio Ct. App.

1987); Brown v. Johnstone, 450 N.E.2d 693, 695 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).
7
See Toulmin v. Becker, 124 N.E.2d 778, 783 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954).
8
Taylor v. Sheldon, 173 N.E.2d 892 (Ohio 1961). In Taylor, the Supreme
Court of Ohio held that: Where a person approaches an attorney with the view
of retaining his services to act on the former's behalf, an attorney-client
relationship is created, and communications made to such attorney during the
preliminary conferences prior to actual acceptance or rejection by the attorney
of the employment are privileged communications. Id. at 893.
9
See, e.g., People v. Bennet, 810 P.2d 661, 664 (Colo. 1991); Huddleston v.
State, 376 S.E.2d 683, 684 (Ga. 1989); Committee on Prof. Ethics & Conduct of
the Iowa State Bar Assoc. v. Wunschel, 461 N.W.2d 840,845 (Iowa 1990).
10

Prather v. Presby, 13 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 169 (1912).

11

See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8.2

(3d ed. 1989).
12
Id.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1977) providing that:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the
the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability
to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
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Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe,13 for example, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota confirmed a $649,000.00judgment for negligence for failing to warn
the client about a statute of limitations problem. Even though the attorney had
refused to represent the client, the court found sufficient evidence under both
a tort and contract analysis, to support a finding that an attorney-client
relationship existed. In so doing, the court noted that a negligence analysis
should include a showing that:
[the attorney] rendered legal advice (not necessarily at someone's
request), under circumstance which made it reasonably foreseeable to
the
the attorney that if such advice was rendered negligently,
14
individual receiving advice might be injured thereby.
Another example appears in Procanik by Procanik v. Cillo,15 where the
plaintiffs had retained an attorney to investigate a potential medical
malpractice action. The attorney consulted a second attorney, who specialized
in medical malpractice, to see whether the specialist would be interested in
accepting the case. 16 After reviewing the file and the medical records, the
specialist declined representation. 17 The plaintiffs later brought suit against the
second attorney, claiming that he negligently rendered legal advice. 18 The issue
before the court was whether an attorney must act in a professionally
reasonable manner when declining representation of a potential client.' 9 The
court held that when an attorney declines representation he need not give his
reasons for doing so, however, if he voluntarily provides a reason it must be
20
professionally reasonable under the circumstances.
Underlying the attorney-client relationship is the assumption of a duty owed
by an attorney to the client.2 1 It has been the general rule in Ohio that attorneys

reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise
such care increased the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered
because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
13291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980).
141d. at 693.

15543 A.2d 985, 986-87 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), cert. denied, 550 A.2d
466 (N.J. 1988).
16 Id. at 987
17Id. at 988.
18Id. at 990.
19 Id. at 993.
20 Cillo, 543 A.2d at 993.
21 The Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility expresses, in general terms,
the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers. It is from these
expressions that the Disciplinary Rules are derived.
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owe no duty to non-client third parties. 22 This precept evolved from the
traditional rule that a lawyer cannot be held liable to a plaintiff unless the
plaintiff is in privity with the client.23 In recent years, however, several states
have recognized exceptions to this privity requirement. In the often cited case
of Lucas v. Hamm, 24 California led the way in allowing deviation from this
privity requirement. 25 The rationale for this approach appears to be that one
who renders legal advice under any set of facts is liable to those individuals
whose reliance upon said advice is foreseeable. 26 While the foreseeability test
has been adopted by a number of jurisdictions, no Ohio case has yet to adopt
the rule. In fact, this line of reasoning was recently rejected by the Tenth District
27
Court of Appeals in the case of Columbus Consol. Agency, Inc. v. Wolfson.
In Columbus Consol., plaintiffs, who were purchasers in an investment
program, sued their attorney for rendering an erroneous opinion as to whether
the program would involve the sale of a security under Ohio or federal
securities law.28 The attorney had erroneously concluded that the transactions
would not involve such a sale.29 The plaintiffs instituted a class action based
upon two alternative legal theories: (1) That they were in privity with the
attorney,-30 and (2) that the attorney could be liable to them as third parties
whose reliance was specifically foreseen. 31 After rejecting the plaintiffs' first
argument, the court addressed the "foreseeability" issue:
[The plaintiff-a]ppellants argue in their second assignment of error
that the trial court erred in failing to consider both (1) their argument
regarding liability to third parties whose reliance is specifically
foreseen, and (2) their argument regarding potential liability to
individual purchasers under the Ohio securities statutes. Appellants
support these arguments by citing the Ohio securities statutes and
Haddon View Investment Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand (citation omitted),
where the Supreme Court held that accountants may be held liable by
a third party for professional negligence when the third party is a
member of a limited class whose reliance on the accountant's

22
23

Elam v. Hyatt Legal Services, 541 N.E.2d 616 (Ohio 1989).
Scholler v. Scholler, 462 N.E.2d 158 (Ohio 1984).

24364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
25

It appears that a majority of states have adopted this approach.

26

Lucas, 364 P.2d at 687.

27591 N.E.2d 385 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
28

Id. at 386.
29 Id.
30
31

Id. at 386.
Id. at 388.
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representation is specifically foreseen. As discussed previously,
however, in Scholler, ...the court set forth a specific rule of law
governing when a third party can maintain an action against an
attorney. Pursuant to this holding in Scholler, the potential class
members in the instant case cannot maintain an action against the
attomey-appellees. We therefore do not reach appellants' argument
that is based upon the Haddon View rationale, which applies to
accountants and not attorneys. Nor do we reach appellants' argument
that there may be potential liability to individual purchasers under the
Ohio securities statutes since the purchasers in this matter have no
standing to bring such an action. Accordingly, appellants'
second
32
assignment of error is not well taken and is overruled.
Currently, most states recognize three main exceptions to this general rule
that an attorney is not liable to non-client third parties: (1) intentional acts, (2)
negligent misrepresentation, and (3) third party beneficiaries. The extent to
which these exceptions are recognized in Ohio warrants a closer examination.
1. Intentional Acts
Ohio courts recognize that an attorney can be liable to a third party, absent
privity, if the attorney, in representing his client, commits an act of fraud,
maliciously prosecutes, abuses process, or does anything to intentionally harm
a third person.33 An action based on an intentional act has advantages and
disadvantages. The most significant advantage, common to all actions for an
intentional act, is that privity between the attorney and the aggrieved party is
not required.34 This is because the nature of the action sounds in tort. One
disadvantage is the ultimate collectability of the final judgment. Most
malpractice insurance polices contain exclusionary language for fraudulent
acts. 35
a. Fraud
Fraud is defined as the "concealment or misrepresentation of a fact or set of
facts material to the transaction between the parties, the falsity of which is
known to the defendant (or if not actually known, should have been known),

32

Columbus Consolidated,591 N.E.2d at 388.

33Scholler v. Scholler, 462 N.E.2d 158 (Ohio 1984).
34 Id. at 163.
35 See generally David J.Meiselman, Attorney Malpractice:Law and Procedure
§ 21:6, at 327-28 (1980)(discussing cases determining whether such
exclusionary langu;'ge is enforceable by the courts). "This policy does not apply
to any judgment or final adjudication based upon or arising out of any
dishonest, deliberatelyfraudulent, criminal, malicious or deliberate wrongful
acts or omissions committed by the insured.. ."(emphasis added). Id.
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by which falsity the defendant intends to mislead the plaintiff and in reliance
"36
on which the plaintiff acts to his detriment.
There are several advantages to bringing an action for fraud, as opposed to
malpractice. First, as previously noted, an action for fraud sounds in tort, not
in contract; thus, privity is not a requirement.37 Furthermore, the plaintiff
benefits from a four-year statute of limitations period. 38 Finally, the time when
the statute of limitations begins to toll is more advantageous to the plaintiff in
a fraud claim because "[a] cause of action for fraud does not accrue until the
fraud and the wrongdoer [is] actually discovered."39
An action for fraud, however, has its disadvantages as well. Initially, courts
will examine the factual bases of the complaint in order to determine the "gist"
of the lawsuit.4 0 If the complaint involves legal malpractice, the court will
invoke the one-year period of limitations, irrespective of the allegations set
forth in the complaint. 41 Therefore, in order for an action brought after the one
year limitation to be successful, the complaint must focus upon the attorney's
fraudulent acts. A good illustration of this is DiPaolo v. DeVictor,42 which
involved the administration of a decedent's estate. In DiPaolo, the widow and
her five children filed a legal malpractice claim against officials of her
husband's company, and two attorneys, for excluding the company from the
estate's assets. 43 The attorneys were also employed by the executrix as her
counsel during the administration. Apparently, the attorneys, at the direction
of the president of the company, told the plaintiffs that they had no legal or

36
37

Hibbett v. City of Cincinnati, 446 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

38

OHuo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.09(C)(Baldwin 1989).

39

See infra Part III, discussing when the statute of limitations begins to toll

in a legal malpractice case.
40
Hibbett, 446 N.E.2d at 835.
41

See, e.g., id. at 835-36 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982)(rejecting plaintiff's classification
of legal malpractice claims as claims of negligence, breach of contract and
fraud, and, thereby, striking down plaintiff's attempt to invoke the longer
statute of limitations periods of O.R.C. § 2305.07 and § 2305.09(C) & (D)).
42555 N.E.2d 969 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
43

Id. at 971.
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equitable interest in the businessA4 In response to the complaint, the defendant45
attorneys filed a motion to dismiss which was ultimately granted.
On appeal, the court held that absent privity between the third parties and
the executrix, the defendants were immune from liability while serving as
attorneys for the executrix, unless the attorneys acted maliciously.46 The court
found that the alleged fraud arose from statements made during the course of
defendants' representation. 4 7 The court went on to note that "such
representation constitutes a fundamental aspect of the attorney-client
relationship.' 48 Hence, the existence of the attorney-client relationship gives
49
rise to a presumption that the attorney acted in good faith.
In DiPaolo, the court noted that on the face of the complaint, none of the
plaintiffs except for the widow had formed an attorney-client relationship with
defendant-lawyers. 50 Therefore, no cause of action accrued to third parties
51
unless they were in privity with her or the defendants acted maliciously. The
court then discussed the legal malpractice claims and concluded that they were
correctly dismissed as being time barred. 52 The court noted that the plaintiff
malpractice
clearly discovered some, albeit not all, of the details of the alleged
53
and resultant injury during the administration of the estate.
In an action for fraud, the burden of rebutting the presumption that the
attorney acted in good faith lies with the plaintiff.5 4 The plaintiff must
55
specifically allege that the defendant's actions were for his own personal gain.
For pleading purposes, Ohio Civil Rule 9(B) requires that a cause of action for
fraud must be pled with particularity. 56 Perhaps this deficiency led the DiPaolo
44 Id.
45

Id.at 972.

46 Id. at 975.
47
DiPaolo, 555 N.E.2d at 975.
48 Id.
49

Id.

50 d.
51

id.

52

DiPaolo, 555 N.E.2d at 975.

53

Id.

5

4Id.

55

Id.at 976.
To meet the particularity requirement the plaintiff must: (1) specify the
statements claimed to be false; (2) state, in the complaint, the time and place
where the statements were made; and (3) identify the defendant claimed to
have made the statement. See Kordi v. Minot, 531 N.E.2d 318 (Ohio Ct. App.
1987).
56
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court to conclude that, absent the allegations of personal gain, it was impossible
to make such inferences. Therefore, the court of appeals properly concluded
that the action was one in malpractice, not fraud, and was properly dismissed
57
as barred by the statute of limitations.
The foregoing discussion illustrates why, in Ohio, it is extremely difficult for
a third party to succeed against an attorney in an action for fraud. First, the
applicable statute of limitations is determined from the complaint and not from
the form of the pleading. Second, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that
the attorney did not act in good faith. Usually, this burden will require a
showing that the attorney's actions were for his own personal gain. If either
one of these burdens is not satisfied, the court will likely determine that the
case is one properly based on malpractice and therefore is not subject to the
four-year statute of limitations.
b. Malicious Prosecution
An action by a third party for malicious prosecution presents some unique
problems. In general, such an action requires the plaintiff to establish that:
A private person who initiates or procures the institution of criminal
proceedings against another who is not guilty of the offense charged
is subject to liability for malicious prosecution if
(a) he initiates or procures the proceedings without probable cause
and primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to
justice, and
(b) the proceedings have terminated in favor of the accused.58
In Ohio, an action for malicious prosecution has been extended to civil
actions insofar as the plaintiff establishes that some interference with the
59
plaintiff's person or property has resulted from the attorney's actions.
Because an attorney is an agent acting on behalf of his client, he cannot be liable
to a third party unless he acts beyond the scope of his authority.60 Courts
continue to recognize that an attorney must be afforded some immunity from
suits by third persons so that he may properly represent his clients. 61 As a
result, suits for malicious prosecution are not favored by courts because they
serve as a restraint upon the right to resort to courts for lawful redress. 62
57
58

DiPaolo,555 N.E.2d at 976.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (1977).

59

See, e.g., Shore Shirley & Co. v. Kelley, 531 N.E.2d 333, 337 (Ohio Ct. App.
1988).
6°W.D.G. Inc. v. Mutual Mfg. & Supply Co., 5 Ohio Op. 3d 397 (Franklin
Cty. 1976). But see, Woyczynski v. Wolf, 464 N.E.2d 612 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
61
W.D.G. Inc., 5 Ohio Op. 3d 397.
62

Woyczynski, 464 N.E.2d at 614.
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Furthermore, the Code of Professional Responsibility imposes upon an
to act honestly and
attorney an obligation to the public and to his profession
63
in good faith in all of the activities he undertakes.
An attorney, however, cannot always justify his actions merely by showing
that he followed his client's instructions. In Board of Education v. Marting,64 the
court held that the question of whether an attorney should be held accountable
65
based upon his capacity as an attorney in a previous action is a jury question.
The court reasoned that the attorney is in a position to know whether the client
is motivated by malice and also knows whether there is no cause for
prosecution. 66 Furthermore, the attorney is in the best possible position to
67
minimize error.
c. Abuse of Process
Many attorneys confuse abuse of process with malicious prosecution.
Perhaps this is so because both torts have very similar elements. For this
discussion, a basic understanding of their differences is all that is necessary.
The significant difference between abuse of process and malicious prosecution
is the point at which malice is manifested. 68 In abuse of process, the malice is
injected after process is initiated. 69 Thus, abuse of process connotes that the
process was properly initiated but lacked proper purpose. Abuse of process is
a proper situation for disciplinary action by the local bar.70 In fact, Ohio Civil
Rule 11 was adopted primarily for the purpose of preventing abuses of the legal
system by making sanctions mandatory if the attorney is found guilty of an
abuse of process.71
Third party actions for intentional acts remain a viable form of redress for a
plaintiff. An action based on an intentional act relieves the plaintiff of the
privity requirement necessary for maintaining a malpractice action. 72

63

W.D.G. Inc., 5 Ohio Op. 3d at 400.

64185 N.E.2d 597 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
65Id.

at 600.

66

Id.
67Id.
68

Donohoe v. Burd, 722 F. Supp. 1507, 1517 (S.D. Ohio 1989), affd, 923 F.2d
854 (6th Cir. 1991).
69
Id.
70
Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co., L.P.A. v. Frecker, 591 N.E.2d 402 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1990).
71
See Bethke v. Baker Motors, No. 58258, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 3679 (8th
Dist. Aug. 23, 1990); Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co., 591 N.E.2d 402.

72Scholler v. Scholler, 462 N.E.2d 158, 163 (Ohio 1984).
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However, these avenues do have their own separate and distinct
complications, which remove some of their appeal. Although privity is not a
requirement, principles of agency law often preclude the plaintiff from
recovering in a case based on an intentional act. 73
2. Negligent Misrepresentation
Like intentional acts, an action for negligent misrepresentation sounds in tort
rather than contract. Therefore, privity is not an essential element to a
successful action. Those jurisdictions which recognize a cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation apply it in a case where:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment,...
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by
their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise
reasonable care
74 or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
Whether an attorney can be liable to a third party for negligent
misrepresentation varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Generally, in the
absence of privity, courts have been reluctant to hold an attorney liable to a
third party for negligent misrepresentation. 75
The legitimacy of a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation by a third
party can be difficult. In order to appreciate the underlying rationale rejecting
a third party's action, a closer examination of the elements is warranted.
As set forth by one Maryland court, to be successful on a negligent
misrepresentation claim, the plaintiff has the burden of proving five essential
elements:
(1) The defendant, owing a duty of care to the plaintiff, negligently
asserts a false statement;
(2) the defendant intends that this statement will be acted upon by
the plaintiff;
(3) the defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff will probably rely
on the statement, which, if erroneous, will cause loss or injury;
(4) the plaintiff justifiably takes action in reliance on the statement;
and

73

See, e.g., Finley v. Schuett, 455 N.E.2d 1324 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).

74

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). See generally,37 AM.JUR.2d

FRAUD & DECEIT, § 209 (1968); 61 A.L.R.4th 615 (1988).
75
See Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb. P.A., 750 P.2d 118
(N.M. 1988); Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 401 N.W.2d 816 (Wis. 1987); Eustis
v. David Agency, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Bell v. Manning,
613 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
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(5) the plaintiff suffers
76 damages proximately caused by the
defendant's negligence.
Immediately, we can identify several problems a court might encounter
when contemplating whether to extend the negligent misrepresentation theory
to cases involving third parties. The most obvious problem with the negligent
misrepresentation theory is that the plaintiff must show that the attorney owed
him a duty.77
The attorney-client relationship imposes a myriad of fiduciary obligations
upon the attorney. The agency law maxim that no servant can serve two
masters suggests that an attorney cannot effectively represent his client while
owing a corresponding duty to a third party. In fact, the Code of Professional
Responsibility addresses this problem when it states:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the
bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of
compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests,
the interests of other clients, nor the desires78of third persons should be
permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
In considering an adverse party as a third party, courts maintain the position
that "an attorney, in representing his client, deals at arm's length with adverse
79
parties and consequently is not liable to such adverse parties for his actions."
The concern many courts have is that an attorney would not devote his entire
energies to his client if he were continually preoccupied with the80possibility of
a claim for negligence by anyone who has dealt with his client.
Fortunately, Ohio has yet to hold an attorney liable to a third party based on
a theory of negligent misrepresentation. However, one case has come
somewhat close. In Scholler v. Scholler,81 the plaintiff-wife sought to set aside a
76

Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618, 627-28 (Md. 1985).
1n determining whether an attorney owes a duty to a third party not in
privity, courts have adopted a "balancing test" whereby the court weighs: (1)
the extent to which the transaction between the lawyer and the second party
was intended to affect the third party; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the third
party; (3) the degree of certainty that the third party did in fact suffer harm; (4)
the closeness of the connection between the conduct of the attorney and the
injury; (5) the moral blame attributable to the lawyer's conduct; and (6) the
policy of preventing future harm. Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown &
Baerwitz, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
78 As adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court set forth in OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ EC 5-2 (Anderson 1983)(emphasis added).
77

79

Bell, 613 S.W.2d at 338.
Id.See also Flaherty,492 A.2d at 626; Green SpringFarms, 401 N.W.2d at 826;
Page v. Frazier, 445 N.E.2d 148, 153 (Mass. 1983).
81462 N.E.2d 158 (Ohio 1984).
80
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divorce decree because she subsequently discovered that her husband failed to
disclose all of his assets. 82 Although the divorce decree was not set aside, she
was successful in getting the child support increased. 83 The plaintiff-wife then
filed the present action, individually and on behalf of her minor son, in part
alleging that her former attorney negligently failed to make complete discovery
of her husband's financial information. 84 Plaintiff further claimed that her
minor son was entitled to recover for the attorney's malpractice. 85 On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Ohio held in part that the son was not in privity with his
mother or the attorney who represented her and could, therefore, not recover
for the attorney's malpractice. 86 Although this result might seem unfair, the
court noted that the son's interests were protected by the domestic relations
87
judge and the probate court.
An action for negligent misrepresentation raises similar issues and concerns
to those which arise in a case based on an intentional act. The existing agency
relationship between an attorney and client introduces a wide variety of
problems that plaintiffs must overcome unless they are in privity with the
attorney.
3. Third Party Beneficiaries
The third exception to the rule requiring privity of contract between an
aggrieved party and an attorney is the third party beneficiary theory. This
theory is frequently advanced by beneficiaries of a will prepared by an attorney.
This issue was first presented to the Supreme Court of Ohio in Simon v.
Zipperstein.88 In Zipperstein, the attorney prepared a will and an antenuptial
agreement for the plaintiff's father.8 9 When preparing these documents, the
attorney neglected to interrelate them.90 When the client-testator died, a
declaratory action ensued wherein the court allowed the second wife to collect

821d. at 160.
83

Id.

84d. at 163.

85 Id.
86

Scholler, 462 N.E.2d at 164. The Court stated that "an attorney who
represents a spouse in the negotiation of a separation agreement does not
simultaneously, automatically represent the interests of a minor child of the
marriage." Id.
87
1d. at 163-64.
88512 N.E.2d 636 (Ohio 1987).
89

Id. at 636-37.

90
For example: The antenuptial agreement provided for a limit upon
inheritance from the estate by his present wife, but did not refer to the will nor
did the will refer to the antenuptial agreement. Id. at 637.
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daughter then brought a malpractice
under both instruments. 91 The decedent's
92
action against the drafting attorney.
In its opinion, the court restated the general rule that absent fraud, collusion,
or malice an attorney may not be liable in a malpractice action where privity is
lacking.93 This rule applies whether the aggrieved party is a beneficiary or a
purported beneficiary.94 The court's rationale is that by having such a rule,
attorneys can direct their attention to their client's needs and not the needs of
some remote party not in privity with the client. 95 Moreover, [ito allow
indiscriminate third-party actions against attorneys of necessity would create
a conflict of interest at all times, so that the attorney might well be reluctant to
offer proper representation to his client in fear of some third-party action
against the attorney himself." 96 In conclusion, the court found that privity was
lacking since Simon, as a potential beneficiary, did not have a vested interest
97
in the estate.
Attorney immunity from liability to will beneficiaries is not absolute. All that
can be concluded from Zippersteinis that between a potential beneficiary whose
interest is not vested, and the attorney for the decedent, no privity exists and
the beneficiary is barred from bringing a legal malpractice claim.
The Zipperstein court left open the question of privity when the beneficiary's
interest in the estate is vested. This question, however, was resolved in Elam v.
Hyatt Legal Services.98 In Elam, an attorney was retained to assist in the
administration of an estate. 99 The decedent's will left a life estate in a parcel of
100
real property to her husband with the remainder to other beneficiaries.
However, the lawyer drafted a deed which excluded the remaindermen's
interest and gave a fee simple to the husband. 101 The remaindermen brought
suit against the attorney seeking damages for the attorney's ignoring the
102
interest of the remainderman when transferring the decedent's real estate.

91
92

id.
Id.

93

Zipperstein, 512 N.E.2d at 638.

94

95

Id.

Id.

96

1d. (quoting W.D.G., Inc. v. Mutual Mfg. & Supply Co., 5 Ohio Op. 3d 397,
399-400 (Franklin Cty. 1976)).
97

Zipperstein, 512 N.E.2d at 638.
98541 N.E.2d 616 (Ohio 1989).
99

1d. at 617.
l O d.
101 Id.
1°2/d. at 617. Both lower courts held that there was no privity between the
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The sole issue on appeal was whether the remaindermen could maintain a
cause of action against the attorney'0 3 In reversing the lower court's decision,
the supreme court held that the remaindermen were in privity with the
executor of the estate.10 4
The Elam court made clear that they did not intend to overrule their holding
in Zipperstein. First, the court noted that the fiduciary of an estate owes a duty
to serve as a representative of the entire estate.10 5 Next, the court distinguished
the present case from Zipperstein: In Elam, the remaindermen's interest was
vested upon the death of the decedent; whereas, in Zipperstein, the
beneficiaries' interest was not vested.106 Consequently, Elam held that "[a]
beneficiary whose interest in an estate is vested is in privity with the fiduciary
of the estate, and where such privity exists the attorney for the fiduciary is not
immune from liability to the vested beneficiary for damages arising from the
attorney's negligent performance. "107
At first blush, it appears that Elam is not going to cause any major shifts in
Ohio law. Privity is still needed to maintain a cause of action for legal
malpractice. The distinction between Elam and Zipperstein is the vested status
of the beneficiaries. Furthermore, Elam was recently interpreted by a Federal
District Court in Firestone v. Galbreath.1 08 Judge Graham, writing for the
majority, observed that Elam involved postmortem services by the attorney to
the executor. 109 At that time, the beneficiaries were already vested.
In light of Zipperstein, Elam, and Firestone, if the beneficiary is not vested at
the time the alleged malpractice occurred, no privity will exist. Therefore, the
beneficiary will lack standing to maintain a legal malpractice action.
B. Breach of Duty
The second element of a successful malpractice action requires a showing
that the representation fell below the standard of skill and care required by the
profession. 10 Defining the appropriate standard of care is problematic and
usually a source of considerable litigation. Unlike the issues of proximate cause
executor and the remaindermen. Therefore, the attorney could not be liable to
the remaindermen. Id.
10 3

Elam, 541 N.E.2d at 618.
104Id.
105 Id.
106MI.
107

Id.

108747 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (rejecting the application of Elam to the
present action).
109M.at 1572.
11

°See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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and damages, the question of whether there is a legal duty is one of law for the
can
courts to determine. 111 If the court finds that no legal duty exists, the11case
2
be dismissed because there can be no negligence or contract liability.
Although a claim for legal malpractice sounds in tort, the presence of an
attorney-client relationship and the scope of that relationship are
contractual. 113 The legal duty owed by an attorney is defined by the contract.
In order to have a valid contractual relationship, the attorney and client must
14
have a "meeting of the minds" regarding the scope of their relationship.1
Because the relationship is created by consent of the parties, it cannot be
assumed nor forced upon an attorney who has the option to accept or decline
the representation. 115
116
This point is illustrated in the case of Jamison v. Norman. In Jamison, the
defendant was retained to represent the plaintiff in a personal injury action
117
The
which resulted from an accident in the course of his employment.
plaintiff never sought the attorney's advice on a workers' compensation claim,
which plaintiff himself initiated. 118 The plaintiff then brought a malpractice
claim against the attorney for failure to advise of the workers' compensation
matter.11 9 The court found no duty on the part of the attorney to advise the
plaintiff because the plaintiff initiated the workers' compensation claim
without seeking the attorney's counsel. Therefore, the workers' compensation
120
claim fell outside the attorney's contract of employment. Although the issue
has not been specifically addressed by the Ohio appellate courts, representation
letters or agreements between attorneys and their clients are critical for this
reason. The trend will probably be to hold the lawyer liable because he is in the
better position to define for the client the scope of his representation.

111

See Strauch v. Gross, 462 N.E.2d 433 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
112Id. at 435. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, who represented the
plaintiff's former spouse, was negligent in handling a dissolution proceeding.
The court found that there had never been an attorney-client relationship in
the dissolution proceeding. Id.
113
See Brown v. Johnstone, 450 N.E.2d 693 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
114

Noroski v. Fallet, 442 N.E.2d 1302 (Ohio 1982).
See MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 11, at § 8.2.
116771 S.W.2d 408 (Tenn. 1989).
115

117

Id. at 409.

118

Id.

119Id.
120 Id. at 410.
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Established case law indicates that the client's expectations with respect to
the representation are controlling. 121 However, it does not appear sufficient to
allege that an attorney-client relationship existed with respect to some matters.
The burden is to establish that the relationship existed with respect to the
particular act or omission upon which the malpractice is based. 122 Attorneys
needs nor for
are neither responsible for ferreting out all of their client's
123
reviewing every legal aspect of the client's transactions.
Finally, in addressing the issue of duty, one must keep in mind that the
plaintiff has to establish the applicable standard of care to be applied. The
standard for an attorney is the same as that of a physician: "An attorney is
required to exercise the knowledge, skill and ability ordinarily possessed and
exercised by members of the legal profession similarly situated." 124 If an
125
attorney fails to meet these requirements he will be liable for negligence.
This burden is required to avoid liability which is based on a disgruntled
client's version of what occurred or what the client believes should have
occurred. 126 A brief review of Ohio cases illustrates that the prevailing view is
that expert testimony is required for determining professional standards of
performance.
Expert testimony is necessary to establish the standard of knowledge and
skill that is ordinarily possessed by members of the legal profession who are
similarly situated. 127 If the plaintiff fails to introduce expert testimony, or the
expert testimony fails to establish the standard, the defendant-attorney is
128
entitled to a directed verdict.
129
Expert testimony can be crucial in the early stages of a malpractice action.
Many of the unsuccessful malpractice claims have failed because the plaintiff

121 See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp, 580 F.2d 1311, 1319
(7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
122 Brandlin v. Belcher, 134 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Shropshire v.
Freeman, 510 S.W.2d 405,406 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974).
123
See MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 11, at § 19.5.
124
Minnick v. Callahan, 24 Ohio Op.3d 104, 105 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
125

Id.

126

Dorf v. Relies, 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966).
Bloom v. Dieckmann, 464 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983)(case of first
impression); Mclnnis v. Hyatt Legal Clinics, 461 N.E.2d 1295 (Ohio 1984). See
generally, 67 O.JUR.3d Malpractice § 16 (1982); Michael A. DiSabatino,
Annotation, Admissibility and Necessity of Expert Evidence as to Standards of
Practiceand Negligence in MalpracticeAction Against an Attorney, 14 A.L.R. 4th
170, 173 (1982).
128
Gibbons v. Price, 514 N.E.2d 127 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
127

129

See Haller v. Close, No. 90-AP-853 (10th Dist. Feb. 5, 1991)(unreported).

Defendants submitted affidavits of their own opinions as to the appropriate
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did not produce any expert testimony.130 The rationale for requiring expert
testimony lies in the fact that without the expert testimony a jury would be left
to speculate as to the appropriate standard of care. 131
Of course, no rule would be complete without some exceptions. In Ohio,
there are two exceptions to the expert testimony requirement. Expert evidence
is not necessary: (1) when the breach is within the ordinary knowledge and
experience of a layman; or (2) if the breach is so obvious that it may be
determined by the court as a matter of law.132
In McInnis v. Hyatt Legal Clinics,133 the court found expert testimony was not
necessary because the claimed breach of professional duty was within the
understanding of the jury.134 In this case, Mclnnis retained the defendant to
represent him in a divorce proceeding.135 Mclnnis asked his attorney to make
sure that information regarding the divorce would not be published in the local
newspapers. 136 After giving Mclnnis written assurance that notice of the
proceeding would not appear in the local papers, notice was published and
McInnis sued claiming legal malpractice. 137 The basis of McInnis' claim was
that his attorney breached his professional duties by failing to use best efforts
to insure that McInnis' request was honored. 138 The court noted that the Code
of Professional Responsibility139 placed upon an attorney a duty to "remember
that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods

standard of care. Haller failed to present any expert testimony on the standard
of care issue. As a result, the court concluded that reasonable minds could only
conclude that there was no breach of duty. Id.
130 See Minnick v. Callahan, 24 Ohio Op. 3d 104 (Ohio Ct. App.
1980)(defendant attorney was entitled to a directed verdict since plaintiff failed
to introduce expert testimony to establish the required standard of care).
131
Id. at 106. See also, Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 573 N.E.2d 159
(Ohio Ct. App. 1989)(expert testimony is required so that the trier of fact does
not have to speculate on the standard of care, particularly in a complex case
involving real estate transactions which are normally not within the
understanding of the layman).
132
Haller,No. 90-AP-853 at 6.
133461 N.E.2d 1295 (Ohio 1984).
134

Id. at 1297.
1 Id. at 1296.
35

1361d.

1371d.
13 8

McInnis, 461 N.E.2d at 1296.

139 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8.
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because of nonlegal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself."140
Here the attorney's breach was so obvious that laymen on the jury could
conclude, without the benefit of expert testimony, that the attorney's actions
fell below the requisite standard of care.1 41 The McInnis decision demonstrates
that a breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility may preclude the need
for expert testimony.
At least one plaintiff was unsuccessful in attempting to prove that a breach
was so obvious that it could be determined by a lay person. In NorthwesternLife
Ins. Co. v. Rogers,142 the plaintiff attempted to persuade the court to adopt a
malpractice per se standard, upon a showing of a violation of the conflict of
43
interest prohibitions contained in the Code of Professional Responsibility.1
Instead of introducing expert evidence on the standard of care issue, the
plaintiff attached an article about legal ethics and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.144 In response, the court stated "that there can be instances
where noncompliance with the Code of Professional Responsibility does not
result in malpractice." 145 The court concluded that expert evidence was
required in this case because of the complex nature of the Code of Professional
146
Responsibility.
We can conclude from the current state of the law that, for the most part, you
should retain an expert witness if you represent a plaintiff in a legal malpractice
action. Likewise, if you are defending the action, you will need to retain an
expert, and should attach their affidavit if you file a motion for summary
judgment. Generally, the only time that expert testimony will not be required
is where the breach is painfully obvious, such as failing to bring an action
within the prescribed statute of limitations period.
Critical to the evaluation of the legal malpractice case is an understanding
of what the particular standard of care is in any given factual situation. Since
both sides will retain experts to testify on this issue, many problems may arise.
Often, when there is a dispute as to whether the defendant-attorney was
negligent, experts reach not only opposite conclusions but also use different
standards. 147 These problems can be confronted earlier in the case with a
motion in limine if the trial court is inclined to face the issue as a legal question,

14 0

McInnis, 461 N.E.2d at 1296-97 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8).

141Id. at 1237.
142573 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
1 3

4 Id. at 162.

144Id.
145Id. at 163.
146 1d. at 163-64.
1

47See, e.g., Waldman v. Levine, 544 A.2d 683 (D.C. 1988).
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precluding the expert from testifying before the jury on the issue.
Unfortunately, there are no reported Ohio cases on point, but other jurisdictions
have addressed the problem where an element of the cause of action depends
upon a pure question of law. 148 Questions of duty generally involve a legal
conclusion which may not be the proper subject for expert testimony.
Clearly no attorney is expected to be infallible, nor an insurer of results,
unless he or she agreed to achieve a specific result. 149 If the area of the law is
doubtful or debatable, the attorney is not responsible for incorrectly predicting
the outcome of subsequent case law. 150 This rule is extremely important
because holding an attorney liable for failing to accurately predict when and
how the law would change would place a tremendous burden on attorneys.
Attorneys would become less willing to take cases which involved an
undefined point of law or one in which its present state places an undue
hardship on certain classes of individuals. Our system of jurisprudence would
suffer if an attorney could not challenge the constitutionality of a law without
the threat of liability to his client.
The attorney has the responsibility of rendering fair and reasonable
professional services which are comparable to those rendered by other
attorneys practicing under similar circumstances. Unlike standard negligence
cases, the standard being applied varies with the circumstances of each case.
Ohio courts have left unanswered the question of whether the particular
standard of care should be different if the defendant attorney holds himself out
as a specialist in a particular area of law. At this time, the locality standard has
not been applied in Ohio. Thus, it appears all practitioners state-wide are held
to the same uniform standard of care whether the venue of the malpractice
action is rural or urban.
C. Damages ProximatelyCaused by Breach
The third element of a legal malpractice claim is damage proximately caused
by the breach. An attorney is not liable to a client for neglect of duty if the
claimed negligence did not proximately cause the plaintiff's injuryJ51 The
theory behind a damage award is to put the former client in a position he would
have been in had the malpractice not occurred.1 52 Thus, like in any negligence

148

Cf. Montgomery v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 898 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir.
1990).
149See, e.g., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Keovon, 451 F. Supp. 397 (D.N.J. 1978);
Nause v. Goldman, 321 So.2d 304 (Miss. 1975).
15 0

Howard v. Sweeney, 499 N.E.2d 383 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
Harter v. Morris, 18 Ohio St. 492 (1869). See also Weiner v. Moreno, 271 So.
2d 217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
152See, e.g., Williams v. Bashman, 457 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Allied
Productions, Inc. v. Duesterdick, 232 S.E.2d 774 (Va. 1977).
151
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action, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant-attorney was the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's damages. 153
This last element is the most difficult for a plaintiff to establish. The existence
of damages depends on two factors: first, whether the underlying legal action
would have been successful had the case been handled competently;15 4 and
second, that the damages are attributable to the malpracticing attorney.155
Perhaps this is why some courts prefer to separate the question of proximate
cause into two separate elements. 156 When such an approach is utilized the
plaintiff will have to show that: (1) the attorney's alleged misconduct caused
the plaintiff's injury; and, (2) that the damages which the-plaintiff sustained
were the proximate result of the attorney's alleged misconduct. 157 Due to the
complex legal issues involved in establishing proximate cause, the two prongs
will be examined separately in an attempt to illustrate the problems associated
with each. 158
Initially, it must be noted that the alleged negligence of an attorney is never
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury when a malpractice action is not
ripe for adjudication. 159 Stated another way, unless the attorney's wrongful
conduct deprived the client of something to which he was otherwise entitled,
160
a malpractice action cannot be maintained. For example, in Petruzzi v. Casey,
the Franklin County Court of Appeals held that a legal malpractice action
cannot be maintained if the plaintiff had other remedies available to her.161 The
162
plaintiff, confined to a wheelchair, was a passenger aboard a cruise ship.
Special arrangements were made by the ship's employees to help her get
ashore; specifically, the crew members arranged to carry her down a steep flight
of stairs in order to load her onto a tender.1 63 While she was being carried down
153
154

jablonski v. Higgins, 453 N.E.2d 1296 (Ohio C.P. 1983).
Alfonso v. McIntyre, 387 So.2d 1348 (La. Ct. App. 1980).

155 Gibbons v. Price, 514 N.E.2d 127 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
156

See Jablonski,453 N.E.2d 1296.
1 Id. Ultimately, the amount of damages focuses on what the client would
have recovered had the underlying case been handled competently.
158 A brief review of legal malpractice cases in Ohio illustrates that the courts
are frequently exposed to some of the more esoteric questions that arise in a
legal malpractice case when addressing the issues of proximate cause and
consequential damages.
57

159Petruzzi v. Casey, No. 89-AP-1508,1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1658 (10th Dist.
Apr. 26, 1990).
1601d.
161 Id.

162 Id. at 1633.
163Id. at 1633-34.
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the stairs, one of the crewmen lost his grip and Petruzzi fell and suffered
injuries. 164 When she returned home, she contacted defendant to handle her
personal injury case. 165 After advising her that he did not handle personal
injury matters, he referred her to a second attorney. 66
Upon reviewing the merits of the case, the second attorney discovered that
the ticket issued to Petruzzi contained a provision which imposed a one-year
statute of limitations for any personal injury actions against the cruise line and
a notice provision requiring the complainant to notify the cruise line of any
claims within six months of the date of the occurrence. 167 After the second
attorney refused to pursue her claim, Petruzzi filed a malpractice action against
168
the first attorney.
In her complaint, Petruzzi claimed that Casey's alleged negligence
precluded her from filing suit against the cruise line.1 69 In response, Casey
argued that the limitations did not bar an action against the crewmen or an
action against the cruise line in either Federal Admiralty Court or in the state
courts of Florida. 170 The court found that since these other avenues of legal
recourse were available, the plaintiff was not precluded from pursuing her
personal injury claim for damages. 171 Therefore, her legal malpractice action
172
against Casey was premature.
1. Success in the Underlying Legal Action
In order for a plaintiff to succeed in a legal malpractice action, it must be
shown that the plaintiff possessed a valid claim or defense. The procedural tool
which is utilized by the courts for demonstrating legal malpractice at the trial
level has been coined in the phrase a "suit within a suit". 173 Under Ohio law,
the issue of proximate cause in a legal malpractice action is not satisfied if the
plaintiff cannot show that he would have successfully prosecuted or defended

164Petruzzi,No. 89-AP-1508 at 1634.
1651d.

166Id.
167 1d.
168Id.
169

Petruzzi, No. 89-AP-1508 at 1637.

170Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. Another interesting case where an attorney avoided liability because
the client had another option available is Mitchell v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 551
S.W.2d 586 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
173

Petruzzi, No. 89-AP-1508 at 1637.
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the underlying suit absent the alleged malprac tice.174 Proof that the underlying
suit would have been successful raises interesting problems particularly
concerning burdens of proof, discovery, testimony of the trial judges and
bifurcation of the suit within a suit.
a. Burden of Proof Where the Underlying Action was Voluntarily Settled
Although proving the "suit within a suit" appears to place a substantial
burden on the plaintiff, often it works to the defendant's disadvantage. Initially,
the "suit within a suit" requirement places the burden of proof on the
plaintiff.175 This burden is appropriate, especially in legal malpractice cases
where the plaintiff was unsuccessful in the underlying action. However, this
burden is relaxed and, on occasion, appears to shift to the defendant when the
underlying action is voluntarily settled by the plaintiff.176 This recurring
situation is the source of great frustration for the defendant in a legal
malpractice action. In this scenario, a plaintiff no longer must prove the success
of the underlying case, and in fact, it is the opposite conclusion that a plaintiff
desires. Thus, the burden shifts to the defendant who must show that, but for
the voluntary settlement, the plaintiff would have been successful in the
underlying action.
Since the underlying case was never litigated, there is simply no way to know
whether the defendant's representation fell below the expected standard,
unless his negligence was so obvious that a settlement was in the best interest
of the plaintiff. This problem is compounded when the defendant was not the
attorney in the underlying action. This situation usually occurs in third-party
beneficiary cases where the defendant's alleged negligence precluded the
third-party from receiving some benefit to which she was entitled. 177
While the trend seems to support the position that voluntary settlement of
the underlying action should not preclude the plaintiff from bringing a legal

174 Here, again, expert testimony is necessary. For example, in Lemke v.
Rudd, No. 10883, 1989 Mont. App. LEXIS 1312 (2d Dist. Apr. 12, 1989), the
plaintiff testified that she instructed her attorney to seek a new trial with a jury.
However, the attorney decided to have a judge decide the case. Although the
court found that a failure to abide by specific instructions may be sufficient to
establish a breach of duty without expert testimony, the court affirmed the
verdict because the plaintiff did not introduce any expert testimony on the issue
of proximate cause. Id.
175 See, e.g., Sherry v. Diercks, 628 P.2d 1336 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980); Minnick
v. Callahan, 24 Ohio Op.3d 104 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
176See, e.g., Glidden v. Terranova, 427 N.E.2d 1169 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
177 See, e.g., Pelham v. Grieshemer, 440 N.E.2d 96 (Ill. 1982).
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malpractice claim, 178 this position should only be followed when the defendant
attorney's alleged malpractice was the cause in fact of settling the underlying
action. 179 In such a case, there should be sufficient evidence to support a jury
finding that the plaintiff was damaged by the attorney's negligence in
prematurely settling the underlying case and that the settlement would have
been greater absent said negligence. Any view to the contrary will inhibit
judicial economy by discouraging attorneys from promoting out-of-court
settlements. The issue of forced settlements has not been specifically addressed
in Ohio; however, other jurisdictions have held that an attorney may be found
liable for negligently causing a client to settle a claim for an amount less than
what he could have legitimately anticipated receiving if not for the lawyer's
180
negligence.
b. Discovery Problems
Proving the "suit within a suit" imposes additional burdens on the
defendant. Initial discovery in malpractice cases provides the plaintiff with
depositions, statements, and exhibits from the underlying case, not to mention
the arguments and inferences, with the benefit of hindsight, to show a jury how
the case would have been won if the attorney properly prosecuted it. On the
other hand, the defendant's attorney often has to rely on witnesses and former
parties who no longer want to be involved in the dispute between the plaintiff
and his former attorney. These facts frequently appear in domestic relations,
personal injury, or commercial and consumer litigation.
c. Testimony of Trial Judge
Many negligence claims involve an underlying action which has often gone
to trial. For example, an attorney may be criticized for failing to present certain
forms of testimony at trial or for failing to raise a particular defense. As a result,
the testimony of the trial court judge or the opposing attorney from the
underlying action may be relevant. The case law is not clear on whether the
judge who presided over the original trial may testify in a subsequent
malpractice action. While Canon 2(b) of the Code of Judicial Conduct prevents
a judge from lending the prestige of his office "to advance the private interests
of others,"181 Canon 2 does not afford a trial court judge a privilege against
testifying in response to an official summons. 182 Therefore, it is possible to

178

See Broad v. Conway, 675 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. N.Y. 1987), affd without op.,
849 F.2d 1467 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 927 (1988); Haskin v. Sullivan,
550 N.E.2d 799 (Ind.Ct. App. 1990); King v. Jones, 483 P.2d 815 (Or. 1971).
179 See, e.g., Sawchyn v. Westerhaus, 593 N.E.2d 420 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
18 0

Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377 (Mass. 1986).
181 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1991).
1821d.
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argue that the trial judge can testify when subpoenaed. This would allow him
to offer an opinion on how an attorney handled a particular matter. This was
the scenario in Woodruff v. Tomlin, 183 where a trial judge was allowed to testify
concerning the competency of attorneys who had appeared before him in trial
proceedings.184
There is perhaps one reason for precluding testimony of a trial court judge.
Ohio Rule of Evidence 404A, provides for the inadmissibility of otherwise
relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice."185 It may be argued that this provision of the Ohio
Rules of Evidence may be employed to preclude admission into evidence of
the testimony of the judge who presided in the underlying matter, particularly
where the judge is being called to testify to a matter that might otherwise be
the subject of independent expert testimony.
Once a jury is satisfied that the attorney was negligent, few cases are lost for
failure to also prove proximate cause. To ameliorate the harshness of proving
the "suit within a suit," some other states have shifted the burden of proof to
the attorney, or at least the burden of going forward with evidence to prove the
former client could not have succeeded on the original claim. 186
d. Bifurcation
187
Often courts bifurcate the "suit within a suit" and allow it to proceed first.
The benefits of bifurcation vary from case to case and involve a mixture of
strategy considerations. For example, assume that the lawyer is accused of
negligence in the handling of a plaintiff's personal injury case. If the case is
bifurcated, and the question of whether the lawyer's conduct fell below the
applicable standard of care is tried first, the evidence relating to the severity of
the plaintiff's medical injuries are irrelevant. The trial court and jury can focus
on the issue of the lawyer's conduct without their attention being diverted by
concerns relating to the question of the plaintiff's injury and damages. If such
a case is not bifurcated, the trier of fact will hear the evidence relating to both
liability and damages at the same time. Under those circumstance it may be
more difficult for the trier of fact to separate the two issues.
Other advantages to bifurcation are judicial economy and the saving of
expenses by the parties. If the court bifurcates the case and tries the issue of
liability first, a subsequent trial for damages may prove unnecessary.

183593 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1979).
184

Id.at 42.

18501-to R. EVID. 404A.
186

Lowev. Continental Ins. Co., 437 So.2d 925 (La. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 942 (1984); Sherry v. Diercks, 628 P.2d 1336 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981);
Glidden v. Terranova, 427 N.E.2d 1169 (Mass. Ct. App. 1981).
187See, e.g., Fuschetti v. Bierman, 319 A.2d 781 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1974).
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Bifurcation also has the practical effect of stimulating settlement. If a lawyer
loses on the liability issue, a damages settlement becomes more likely.
2. Damages Proximately Related to Malpractice
In addition to success in the underlying case, a plaintiff cannot recover if he
could not have recovered in the original action. 188 Obviously, the attorney's
negligence would not be the "but for" cause of the plaintiff's inability to recover
if the statute of limitations had run. Hence, the solvency of the defendant in the
underlying action can become an issue for the plaintiff as well as the other
elements of the legal malpractice action.
Assuming that the plaintiff can prove that any award in the underlying
action would have been collectable, the question becomes what is the proper
measure of damages? Unfortunately, the courts are split as to whether the
plaintiff is entitled to recover more from the attorney than he could have
recovered in the underlying action. Some jurisdictions hold that the amount of
damages should be reduced by the amount of the underlying contingency
190
fee; 189 while others have come to an opposite conclusion.
Ohio courts have not yet decided the precise issue. However, one court has
demonstrated a willingness to hold the measure of damages equal to the value
of the lost claim. 191 Typically, American jurisprudence has opposed the
recovery of attorney's fees in a tort action. 192 However, the foreseeability
rationale has been applied by non-Ohio courts. In other jurisdictions, courts
have concluded that all of the damages which are foreseeable are recoverable,
including legal fees. 193

188 See McDow v. Dixon, 226 S.E.2d 145 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976)(a client suing for
malpractice must prove that his claim would have been collected); Hoppe v.
Ranizini, 385 A.2d 913 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978)(a malpractice action
involves the degree of collectability of such judgment). See also Sitton v.
Clements, 385 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1967).
189 Sitton v. Clements, 257 F. Supp. 63 (E.D. Tenn. 1966), affd, 385 F.2d 869
(6th Cir. 1967); McGlone v. Lacey, 288 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.S.D. 1968); In re Estate
of Remsen, 415 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1979).
190Christy v. Saliterman, 179 N.W.2d 288 (Minn. 1970); Benard v. Walkup,
77 Cal. Rptr. 544 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969). See generally 7A CJS Attorney and Client
§ 270; Meiselman, supra note 34 at § 4:3. See also Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller
& Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980); Kane, Kane & Kritzer Inc. v. Altagen,
165 Cal. Rptr. 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
191 Porter v. Norris, 285 N.E.2d 14 (Ohio 1972).
192 Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co., L.P.A. v. Frecker, 591 N.E.2d 402 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1990).
193 Sorenson v. Fio Rito, 413 N.E.2d 47 (111. Ct. App. 1989); Jenkins v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 393 So. 2d 851 (La. Ct. App. 1981), affd 422 So.2d
1109 (La. 1982).
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D. Summary

A claim of legal malpractice in Ohio is not ripe unless the plaintiff has
exhausted all other remedies. Once a legal malpractice case is ripe the plaintiff
has the burden of proving the amount and collectability of the lost claim even
if negligence and proximate cause are established. If the original claim could
not have been recovered, then the negligent attorney was not the "but for" cause
of the plaintiff's injury. Although the measure of recoverable damages varies
from case to case, the plaintiff has the burden of presenting sufficient evidence
from which damages can be ascertained. Once that amount can be ascertained,
it arguably may be reduced by the amount of the underlying contingency fee
because the plaintiff was not entitled to the award without having the
attorney's contingency fee deducted. Finally, any damages that are remote or
speculative cannot be recovered. 194

III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
195
The statute of limitations for bringing a malpractice action is one year.
This statute does not expressly include claims of legal malpractice; however,
'at the time this statute was enacted, the common meaning and legal definition
of the term, 'malpractice,' was limited to the professional misconduct of
members of the medical profession and attorneys." 196 Consequently, Ohio
courts have held that this one-year limitation applies to actions against an
attorney for malpractice. 197 Cases which have construed this legislative
mandate illustrate some of the unusual questions which have developed in
legal malpractice cases.
In the beginning, the Supreme Court of Ohio adopted the "termination rule"
for determining when the statute of limitations begins to run in a malpractice
case. 198 The "termination rule" has its origin in medical malpractice cases. 199
The rule states that "[a] cause of action for malpractice against an attorney
accrues, at the latest when the [attomey-]client relationship finally

194 However, even if all the damages are not ascertainable then the existence
of those which are so identifiable gives rise to a cause of action as the precise
amount need not be shown with mathematical certainty. See Zimmie v. Calfee,
Halter & Griswold, 538 N.E.2d 398 (Ohio 1989).
195

OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11(A)(Baldwin 1989).

196

Richardson v. Doe, 199 N.E.2d 878, 880 (Ohio 1964).

197

See Hibbet v. City of Cincinnati, 446 N.E.2d 832 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982). See
generally 67 O.JUR.3d Malpractice § 15 (1986).
198
See Keaton Co. v. Kolby, 271 N.E.2d 772 (Ohio 1971), overruled by Skidmore
and Hall v. Rottman, 450 N.E.2d 684 (Ohio 1983).
199

Id. at 773.
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terminates." 200 This approach can lead to harsh results, especially in the case
where the injury is one which requires a long period of development before it
is discoverable.
The termination rule was superseded by the Ohio Supreme Court in
Skidmore & Hall v. Rottman. 201 In a rather brief opinion, the Skidmore court
4dopted the "discovery rule" for determining when the statute of limitations
begins to run. Like the termination rule, the discovery rule was adopted from
the medical malpractice line of cases. 202 Pursuant to Skidmore, a "[clause of
action... accrues and the statute of limitations commences to run when the
client discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have
discovered, the resulting injury."20 3 The "discovery rule" eases the
unconscionable result to the innocent victim who, by exercising even the
highest degree of care, could not have discovered the malpractice within one
year of its occurrence.
The decision in Skidmore left a number of questions unanswered. Specifically,
Skidmore did not address the situation where the professional relationship
continued after the client discovered the alleged malpractice. This issue was
raised in Omni-Food & Fashion, Inc. v. Smith. 204 In Omni-Food, the plaintiff
owned a food supply and discount business. The plaintiff employed defendant
to assist in the incorporation of his business. 205 In part, this involved making
sure that the registration of certain shares of stock complied with the applicable
securities laws. 206 Apparently, the attorney failed to make sure that the stock
was registered, as evidenced by the class action suit which was brought by
certificate holders who sold 1,251 shares of unregistered stock.207 The
defendant was retained to defend the lawsuit. Unfortunately, an answer was
not timely filed and a default judgment for $7.5 million was entered against the
plaintiff.208 The attorney then advised his client to file bankruptcy, believing
209
that once the debt was discharged plaintiff could resume its business.
Unfortunately, the adverse publicity destroyed their plans.

200 Id.
201450 N.E.2d 684 (Ohio 1983).
202

Id. at 685. See also Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found., 449 N.E.2d
438 (Ohio 1983)(policy considerations).
203450 N.E.2d at 684.
204528 N.E.2d 941 (Ohio 1988).
20

5 Id. at 942.

206
207/d"

5d.

2081Id.
209 Omni-Food, 528 N.E.2d at 942.
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In a subsequent malpractice suit against the attorney, the plaintiffs claimed
$10 million in damages. 210 The defendant responded by filing a motion for
summary judgment asserting, inter alia, that the plaintiff's action was barred
by R.C. 2305.11(A), because plaintiff knew that when an answer was not filed,
a malpractice citing had been comnmitted. 211 The motion, citing Skidmore, was
212
granted and affirmed on appeal.
The issue presented in Omni-Foodwas by no means novel. In fact, the court
entertained the same issue in a similar case which modified the accrual date of
the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case.213 Being consistent in
its practice of following the medical malpractice cases, the Omni-Food court
once again modified the accrual date of the statute of limitations. Under
Omni-Food,a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues when the client either
discovers or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have
discovered the resulting injury,or when the attorney-client relationship for that
particular transaction terminates, whichever occurs later.2 14 The court,
applying this newly adopted standard, held that the termination of the
attorney-client relationship may have occurred at a later date; therefore, the
plaintiffs could maintain the legal malpractice action against the lawyer who
2 15
incorporated them.
The termination rule encourages the parties to resolve their dispute without
litigation and motivates the attorney to mitigate the client's damages. By doing
so, mutual confidence, which is essential to the attorney-client relationship, is
fostered. Also, the rule discourages an unscrupulous attorney from concealing
his malpractice until the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Under the
new standard, the court must determine when a legal malpractice action
accrues under both the termination rule and the discovery rule. 216 Then the
court must compare the two to determine which date is later.217 It is from this
later date that the limitations period will be calculated. 218 This approach is
good because it "isone that fairly and flexibly applies either the termination
219
rule or the discovery rule, depending on the facts of the particular case.'

21

01d.
2111Id.
212 Id.
213

See Frysinger v. Leech, 512 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio 1987).

214

0mni-Food,528 N.E.2d at 944.

215Id. at 945.
216

1d. at 944.

217Id.
218

1d.

219

Omni-Food, 528 N.E.2d at 944.
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The inquiry that courts must now make in light of Omni-Food is not always
220
the court had to
easy. For example, in Zimmie v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold,
determine whether the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action begins
to run even if damages were uncertain. In Zimmie, the plaintiff retained the
defendant's services to prepare an antenuptial agreement to control, inter alia,
221
Fourteen years later
the disposition of property in the event of divorce.
22 2
Unfortunately, the trial court held that the
Zimmie was sued for a divorce.
223
Zimmie unsuccessfully appealed the
antenuptial agreement was invalid.

case all the way to the Ohio Supreme Court. 224 The attorney terminated his
relationship with Zimmie when he realized there was a problem with the
antenuptial agreement.225 He was no longer the attorney of record when the
matter was being appealed. 226 Therefore, the attorney-client relationship had
227
terminated long beyond the one year time period under the termination rule.
Zimmie filed a malpractice action against the attorney who drafted the
antenuptial agreement.228 The defendant responded by filing a motion for
summary judgment asserting that Zimmie was time-barred by R.C.
2305.11(A). 229 Zimmie argued that the complaint was timely filed because it
was filed within one year of the Supreme Court's decision invalidating the
antenuptial agreement.230 The trial court rejected Zimmie's argument because
he knew that the agreement was invalid more than one year before the legal
malpractice action was filed. 231 Moreover, Zimmie knew on the day of the
232
wedding that defendant had failed to prepare his schedule of assets. Also,
court
appellate
and
court
trial
the court considered the two occasions when the

220538 N.E.2d 398 (Ohio 1989).
221

1d. at 399.

222

Id.

223

Id. The court found that Zimmie had not fully disclosed his financial

situation to his wife before she signed the agreement, and that the agreement
was not voluntarily executed. Id.
224
Zimmie, 538 N.E.2d at 399.
225

Id.

226/Id .
227

1d. at 401.

228

at 399.
Id.

229

Zimmie, 538 N.E.2d at 400.
Id.

230

231 Id.
232d
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invalidated the antenuptial agreement well before the one-year period for the
233
filing of the complaint had ended.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that Zimnie was put on notice of his need to
pursue further remedies against the attorney who drafted the agreement when
the antenuptial agreement was held invalid by the trial court.234 The court was
not persuaded by the fact that Zimmie's damages were uncertain. All that was
required to begin tolling the statute under the discovery rule was the
occurrence of some cognizable event. In this case the cognizable event was that
some damage had occurred, the extent of which was irrelevant.
Based on Omni-Food and Zimmie, the statute of limitations begins to run
when there is a cognizable event, or when the attorney-client relationship
terminates, whichever occurs later. The problems that may arise as a result of
the "cognizable event test" are eloquently expressed by Justices Sweeney and
Brown in the Zimmie dissent. They argued that using the "cognizable event"
standard in cases such as Zimmie is unfair and inappropriate since the basis of
the malpractice action can be reversed on appeal.23 5 In addition, the standard
encourages litigation and discourages attorneys from settling their case. 23 6 The
majority's response to this criticism appears to be a denial of the problem
because a plaintiff can file the legal malpractice action and keep it in abeyance
237
while pursuing appellate relief.
Unfortunately, the majority in Zimmie missed the mark. Fairness compels a
finding that a legal malpractice action should not accrue until the appellate
process is exhausted. Several important policy considerations would be
fulfilled under this approach. First, if the aggrieved party is successful on
appeal, there is either no basis for a legal malpractice case or its value is
minimized and defined. Thus needless litigation will be prevented. Second, if
the aggrieved party is unsuccessful on appeal, the malpracticing attorney will
be more likely to resolve the dispute outside of court through settlement
negotiations. Third, the knowledge and resources of the attorney will be readily
available to assist the plaintiff in favorably resolving the matter before an
adversarial relationship develops. Finally, if the alleged malpractice involves
an intricate matter, such as a complex federal tax issue, a tribunal which is most
competent to resolve the issue will be called upon to do so.238
233

Id. at 400.

234538 N.E.2d at 402.
235

Id. at 403.

236

1d. at 403-04.

237

1d. at 402.

238For example: Suppose a taxpayer sought tax advice from an attorney.
Subsequently, the I.R.S. disallowed the particular benefit that the taxpayer was
advised he would get. Not requiring the aggrieved taxpayer to appeal to the
tax court before filing his legal malpractice claim would necessarily require a
court of general jurisdiction to resolve questions of federal tax which could be
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Presently, the "cognizable event" standard is a troubling precedent for
someone litigating a legal malpractice case because the plaintiff is not forced
to exhaust his remedies in the underlying action before he may file a
malpractice claim. It is difficult to foresee whether the court will review this
question again in the future. Hopefully it will, and when it does, the cognizable
event standard should be modified to include a requirement that the appellate
process be exhausted before the legal malpractice claim may be filed. Only then
will the public policy considerations be advanced while maintaining fairness
to the parties involved.
IV. FINAL THOUGHTS

Although the principal function of this article has been to focus on the more
significant issues in the anatomy of a legal malpractice case, we have also
visited the repeating problems and emerging dilemmas for which there are no
significant decisions to answer our inquiries. There are certainly many other
equally important considerations when either prosecuting or defending a legal
malpractice lawsuit and one of these ancillary topics is legal malpractice
insurance coverage. Although time does not permit adequate discussion of the
nuances of all malpractice insurance problems in this article, suffice it to say
that pitfalls await the practitioner with the more contemporary and less
protective coverage known as the "claims made" policy which limits the risk
of the insurer to only those claims made prior to or during the coverage period.
Often the insurer may look to the application to see whether or not the insured
accurately set forth all potential errors, omissions or personal injury which may
result in a claim against them. If, indeed, it appears from the insurer's review
of the claim file that its insured was on prior notice of this potential claim at
the time of the application, then coverage may be in jeopardy. This can be the
basis of a denial of coverage from the basic policy language as well as
exclusionary provisions within the policy such as those exclusions where
negligent acts complained of occurred prior to coverage even though the
consequences of the negligence was not realized by the plaintiff until during
the coverage period.
Finally, some parting thoughts are worth mentioning that do not pertain
specifically to the "nuts and bolts" of a legal malpractice lawsuit or legal
malpractice claims, in general, in Ohio but certainly can help us avoid those
situations. I have taken the liberty of listing them in my "to do" list as ten
principal steps to take to avoid legal malpractice claims.
1. Do return all telephone calls timely and keep your client advised
of the progress of his/her case.
2. Do diary all important dates and devise a practical system of
office monitoring of these dates or purchase the appropriate software
package that can be integrated with your law office systems.
resolved in the taxpayer's favor in tax court. Justice and fairness dictate that
this policy should not prevail in legal malpractice cases.
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3. Do actually listen to the client. During coniferences, be it by
phone or in person, show concern, interest, understanding and respect
and retain your notes in the file whenever possible.
4. Do represent your client zealously but avoid emotional
attachment which might impair your ability to render objective and
independent advice.
5. Do refer a case to a specialist when indicated as well as
maintaining continuing education courses in your own field of
practice.
6. Do maintain detailed records and documents to support your
fee, including a written itemization describing the services rendered
contemporaneously with the date and the time expended on the client
matter.
7. Do discuss fees fully and freely at the initial conference using
written retainers whenever possible and confirming, in writing,
settlement offers, demands and important oral communications that
need to be memorialized in writing.
8. Do use certified mail when rejecting a case, advising the
individual that they are free to seek other legal counsel and when you
believe the statute of limitations will expire. Where statute of limitation
problems may be involved, advise the client immediately in a written
letter of rejection as to the earliest date by which you estimate the
statute will expire.
9. Do periodically review the Code of Professional Responsibility.
10. Do maintain professional liability insurance and report claims
and all potential claims in a timely fashion.
In conclusion, the principals of jurisprudence, whether they pertain
specifically to legal malpractice or tort law, have been imbedded in our society
for centuries; however, with changing conditions in our world today, more and
more people are holding lawyers accountable and to a higher standard.
Perhaps this is because of higher expectations as we saw occur within the
medical malpractice crisis several years ago; nevertheless it is important that
lawyers, as practitioners, understand the environment in which they practice
as they implement the essential elements of a legal malpractice case from
either the plaintiff or defendant perspective.
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